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THE MANAGEMENT OF HUNTING
LEASES BY RURAL LANDOWNERS
By John K. Thomas, Clark E. Adams
And John F. Thigpen I11
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Fee access has been a traditional practice for approximately one
of every three hunters. Although the advantages and disadvantages of
fee or lease hunting (Guynn and Schmidt 1984; Monill 1987) and the
demand side of lease hunting (Bergstrom and Cordell 1991; Langner
1988; Messonier and Luzar 1990; Pope and Stoll 1985; Wright 1985)
have been well discussed, studies of the supply side, specifically
landowners and their activities that affect lease income, have been
limited (Messonier and Luzar 1990; Steinbach et al. 1987; Wright
1985).
In this study, we examined the leasing behavior of Texas
landowners and how their behaviors affected net lease income. It has
been estimated that more $100 million is spent annually on leases to
access game species for hunting in Texas, producing a total annual
value of wildlife that ranges from $100 million to $300 million when
other spending by hunters is considered (Pope et al. 1984). How rural
landowners manage their lease operations affects both this recreational
market and the quality of habitat and game species that attract hunters.

Texas Hunting Leases
Regulation of the selling of Texas hunting leases on private lands
began in 1925. Since then, the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department
(TPWD) annually has sold hunting-lease licenses to private
landowners, hunting clubs, corporations, and other groups. A license
permits a landowner or operator to legally sell hunting leases to the
public. A landowner is required by state law to purchase a license for
each parcel of land designated for lease hunting. License fees vary
according to the number of acres to be leased -- $15 for less than 500
acres, $40 for 500 to 1,000 acres, and $60 for more than 1,000 acres.
Hunting clubs, or cooperatives, pay $60 for a license, regardless of the
number of acres involved.
The types of leases sold vary by time and other conditions. There
are generally three types of time-based leases. The first two and most
common in Texas are annual and seasonal leases. With these leases, a
landowner provides to a hunter or group of hunters the right to hunt
for a full year, or for a particular hunting season. Such leases often
allow hunters to hunt several game species. The seasonality of a hunt
involving particular game species is regulated by the TPWD. With
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annual and seasonal leases, hunters and landowners negotiate what
services and facilities are to be provided by the landowner and what
hunters may do to improve hunting conditions on the land. For
example, a landowner may not provide cold storage facilities yet will
allow hunters to place these facilities at a campsite. The other type of
time-based lease is day-hunting. In this arrangement, a landowner
permits a hunter access to game species on the land on a per-day basis.
This short-term arrangement is usually limited only to right of ingress
without provision of services or facilities (Thomas et al. 1989;
Grarnann 1986).
In addition to the time condition of a lease, a landowner can base
a lease on the number of hunters and groups, number of acres, and
types of animals to be harvested. Leases sold by the "gun" refers to the
number of individual hunters allowed to hunt at a specified time (i.e.,
annually, seasonally, or daily). A landowner who sells leases to
outfitters and to recreational or sports clubs permits these groups to
assume most of the responsibility for managing hunting activity on the
land. An acre-based lease is self-explanatory. Leases based on the
animal to be "bagged" or harvested during a hunting season may differ
according to the number, sex, size, antler development, and other
characteristics of the game.
A derivation of this type of lease
involves the hunting of exotic game which has been imported and
bred in private hunting preserves. Exotic game in Texas include
several species of deer (e.g., axis, sika, and fallow), aoudad sheep,
blackbuck and nilgai antelope, and elk. Landowners generally sell an
exotic game lease on a single or trophy-kill basis.

Study Model
Our model was based on two economic theories. Least-cost or
profit-maximization theory (PMT) explains some landowners'
management and lease practices by pointing to landowners' motives of
profit maximization (Obrinsky 1983; Shackle 1970). PMT states that
landowners who sell hunting leases will seek to minimize their costs
by providing a minimal number of inputs such as facilities and
services. By keeping expenses low, landowners can charge lease fees
that are mainly determined by hunter demand and competition among
local lease operators. Conversely, they attempt to maximize profits by
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providing short-term (e.g., game processing) and long-term (e.g.,
cabins and walk-in coolers) multiple inputs and intensely manage their
leases to compete for and serve a socioeconomically upscale hunter
clientele in some markets. PMT assumes that all landowners are
rational and behave similarly and that external market factors, such as
game regulations, affect each landowner equally (Heap 1989;
Polkinghorn 1979).
Economic behavioral theory (EBT) originated with Gabriel
Tarde's La Psychologie Economique (1902) in which he proposed that
economic decision making is affected by personal and non-economic
motives, incomplete and inaccurate use of information, and
uncertainty (March and Sevon 1988). Rural landowners possess
different natural resource-related values and information processing
abilities, which can also influence their decision making (Warneryd
1988). Many landowners are not always driven by profit-making
motives when they decide to lease or not to lease their land to hunters
(Brown et al., 1984; Kaiser and Wright, 1985). Because of these
factors, sorting out landowner' decisions to or not to sell and manage
hunting leases is difficult and complex.
In our study, we expected to find landowners who sold hunting
leases for profits and for non-economic reasons. We assessed the
extent to which rural landowners treated their lease activities as
businesses in two distinctive ecoregions of Texas. We expected to
find the number of management practices conducted on hunting leases
positively affected leasing activities and net incomes. Texas was
selected because it has one of the largest private lease systems in the
United States (Wiggers and Rootes 1987; Wright 1985), one of the
most diverse ecoystems (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1979). and
one of the largest populations of private landowners (U.S. Bureau of
the Census 1990).
By examining lease-related behaviors we were able to apply the
two theories to explain variations in net incomes derived from the sale
of hunting leases. We tested the following hypotheses.

Hypotheses Za-c: (a) Ecological region, (b) years of
operation, and (c) operational status postively aflect the
number of management practices of landowners, the acreages
leased, the numbers of hunters who fee-access hunted, and
landowners net income.
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Ecological Region. Few studies have examined the effect of
ecological diversity on hunting (Messonier and Luzar, 1990).
Although white-tailed deer hunting is popular statewide, we used two
major ecological regions (West Texas = 1, East Texas = 0) to indicate
variations in habitat and hunting conditions (U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service 1979). East Texas represents 79 counties located in the
Pineywoods, Gulf Prairies and Post Oak Savannah ecosystems. These
systems are characterizied by pine and hardwood forests, rolling hills
and marshes. West Texas represents 179 counties located in the South
Texas Plains, Edwards Plateau, Rolling Plains, High Plains and Trans
Pecos ecosystems. West Texas is semi-arid and has escarpment,
savannah and prairie types of terrain. Landowners in this region
operate on average larger farms and ranches than in East Texas and in
some areas, for example Llano County, they have replaced cattle
ranching with the more profitable sale of hunting leases.
Consequently, we expected to find that West-Texas landowners were
more entrepreneurial than East-Texas landowners by more actively
managing lease acreages, leasing more acres to hunters, selling leases
to more hunters, providing free access to fewer hunters, and producing
more net income from the sale of hunting leases.
Years of Operation. Past research is unclear about the effect of
years of operation on the number management practices enacted,
leasing behaviors and the amount of earned lease income. Steinbach
and his colleagues (1987) reported that the longer a landowner
operates a lease, the more likely he will make and accumulate
investments to improve game conditions and to provide services and
facilities to hunters. Their findings would support PMT. However,
Wright (1985) provided evidence supporting EBT when he found that
landowners older than 59 years of age were more likely than younger
landowners in six Texas counties to be apprehensive about the public
hunting on their land, to post their land for trepass, and to allow only
friends and relatives to hunt. The difference in the these studies'
findings may be that the former study was conducted in West Texas
and the latter was conducted in East Texas. Both studies were limited
to small geographical areas. In our statewide study, landowners were
asked to report the number of years their hunting leases had been in
operation. We expected to find results similar Steinbach et al. and to
show that older operations had a larger leasing clientele, fewer
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free-access hunters, and more net income.
Operational Status. A landowners' perception of his lease
operation is an important indicator of his motive for leasing to
hunters. Landowners were asked to indicate if they operated their
hunting leases as business enterprises (yes = 1, no = 0 ). Respondents
who considered their operations to be businesses would be more likely
than other landowners to make needed investments and provide
services to enhance profits by the sale of more and higher fee leases to
hunters. However, cost control is also an important factor that affects
profit margins. Landowners could view the sale of hunting leases as a
low input enterprise to produce supplemental income. These
landowners would be less likely to manage wildlife resources and
provide services and facilities, to lease large numbers of acres to
hunters, and to provide free-access to hunters in order to make a profit
(Steinbach et al. 1987; Pope and Stoll 1985).
Hypotheses 2a,b: The number of (a) management practices
of landowners and (b) the number of acres leased to hunters
positively affect the number of fee-access hunters and
landowners' net income. They negatively affect the number
of free-access hunters.

Management Practices. According to PMT, landowners who
intensively manage game and habitat to improve hunting conditions
have more fee-access hunters, fewer free-access hunters, and earn
more net income than other landowners. Landowners who earn little
or no income have no financial incentive to manage their resources
and provide services, unless they do so for personal reasons, according
to EBT. Landowners and hunters can also negotiate the number and
types of services to be included in a hunting lease (Thomas et al.,
1989). Although the provision of services and facilities may not
significantly contribute to higher lease fees and incomes because of
competitive market conditions and the long-term investment in and
accumulation of facilities (Messonier and Luzar 1990; Pope and Stoll
1985), it could negatively effect operational expenses and net lease
income, particularly for a start-up operation. PMT would predict a
positive effect by management activity on the number of fee-access
hunters and net income. Unlike EBT, it would predict a negative
effect on the number of free-access hunters
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Landowners indicated which of 10 management techniques (yes =
1, no = 0) they used in their 1989-90 lease operation: planted food
plots; fed wildlife; conducted a wildlife census; maintained check
stations; conducted sex and age counts of wildlife; fallow plowed;
constructed high fences; managed tanks and ponds; controlled harvests
of game; and controlled brush. Landowners further reported which of
a series of services and facilities they provided to hunters (yes = 1, no
= 0). Seven services which could have been provided during the
1989-90 hunting season were: hunting guides; game processing;
filling game feeders; food service to hunters; delivery of hunters to
hunting stands; maps of hunting areas; and publishing a newsletter.
Ten types of facilities included: hunting blinds; game feeders; landing
strip; cabin; kitchen; bathroom/showers; utilities; trailer hook-ups;
walk-in coolers; and shooting range. An index score was created from
the sum of each landowner's responses to the three series of questions.
Scores varied from 0 to 27.
Number of Acres Leased to Hunters. The purchase of a license
by a landowner to sell hunting leases does not necessarily have to
result in the sale of a hunting lease nor does a landowner have to lease
all of the acres for which the license was purchased. According to
PMT, a landowner would lease all or most of his land licensed for the
1989-90 hunting season to maximize profit. EBT would indicate a
less optimal leasing behavior by licensed owners who would allow a
large number of free-access hunters to access their land. Research has
shown that size of operation is the primary variable positively
correlated with gross lease income and that larger lease operations
generally have more expenses (Messonier and Luzar 1990; Pope and
Stoll 1985; Steinbach et al. 1987).

Hypotheses 3a,b: The number of fee-access hunters positively
affects landowners' net incomes, while the number of
free-access hunters has an opposite effect.
Numbers of Fee- and Free-access Hunters. According to PMT,
landowners who sell more leases to hunters should produce more net
income than other landowners, when resource investment and acreage
are controlled. In contrast to PMT, EBT proposes that landowners, in
addition to selling leases, provide free huntinf access to friends,
business associates, and relatives. Large numbers of free-access
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hunters would negatively affect a landowner's net income by making
less land safely available to fee-access hunters. We determined the
number of fee-access hunters by adding a landowner's responses to
two questions: "How many hunters paid for leases and live in Texas?"
and "How many hunters paid for leases and live outside of Texas?"
The number of free-access hunters was measured by the question,
"How many hunters, who used this hunting lease, hunted for free?"
Dependent Variable. The dependent variable of the model was
net lease income. Operational expense was measured by the question,
"What were your operating expenses on this hunting lease this
season?" Space limitations of the survey questionnaire did not allow a
detailed enumeration of the types and amounts of these expenses.
Lease income was determined by a series of questions that asked how
much income the landowner realized from the sale of leases by the
gun, number of acres, groups, and animal (exotics). Incomes from
these types of leases were summed to calculate a total income for each
landowner. Net lease income was calculated by substracting lease
expenses from total income.

RESEARCH DESIGN
When landowners purchased a license from the TPWD, they
completed an application form providing current mailing address
information. The 1989-90 list of 12,363 licensees was obtained from
the TPWD. A two-page questionnaire was developed for machine
scanning and mailed in January 1990 to each licensee. A second
questionnaire and post-card to nonrespondents followed two weeks
after the first mailing. Licensees with multiple licenses (6% of all
applicants) were telephoned to ensure that a questionnaire was
completed for each licensed operation. Overall, 60 percent (n =
7,399) responded to the survey. Among this group, 62 percent (n =
4,621) reported being a landowner and having actually operated a
lease during the 1989-90 hunting season; 20 percent were
non-landowners; and 18 percent did not operate leases or derive
income from lease sales. The total list of licensees accounted for
33,769,623 acres in Texas. Licensees who responded to the survey
and operated leases during the 1989-90 season sold hunting leases
involving 11,764,896 acres (Adams et al. 1992).
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We tested our hypotheses by applying the multiple regression
procedure and comparing standardized regression coefficients.
Adjusted R-square coefficients were reported to indicate the total
amounts of variation explained by the independent variables in each of
five regression models. We assessed multicollinearity by examining
the magnitude of bivariate correlations and by calculating variable
tolerances (i.e., subtracting the squared multiple correlation for each
independent variable regressed against the other independent variables
from one). Correlation values were less than .600 and tolerance
values were above .700. A large correlation coefficient and a
tolerance value less than .001 would indicate multicollinearity.
Overall, our results indicated no multicollinear problems among the
data.

FINDINGS
Descriptive Results
Table 1 reports descriptive results for the study variables. The
majority of respondents (82%) owned land in West Texas. Statewide,
licensed landowners had averaged operating leases almost 16 years;
however, only 15 percent operated their leases as businesses. They
averaged using 5 management practices, although 11 percent reported
using none. Lease sizes averaged 2,546 acres, compared with the
median of 566 acres. Landowners generally permitted more fee than
free access to hunters. They sold leases to an average of 14 hunters,
compared with a mean of 3 hunters who were granted free access.
Seven percent sold no leases which indicated that they had negotiated
other arrangements with hunters, such as free-access or land
stewardship (i.e., hunters permitted to hunt if they provided their
facilities or managed the habitat and game). Sixty percent of the
landowners did not allow free access. Overall, landowners averaged
earning $4,579 in net income, compared with a median of $1,500.
Fifteen percent reported net losses.
Multiple regression results are reported in Table 2. Standardized
regression coefficients equal to or greater than .028 were statistically
significant, although low coefficients theoretically were not important.
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Table 1. Descriptive Results of a Survey of Texas Landowners
Licensed to Sell Hunting Leases During the 1989-90
Hunting Season
Variables
(# of respondents)

Percent

Region
(4,461)
Years of operationa
(4,498)

East Texas
West Texas
less than 5
5 to 10
11 or more

17.9
82.1
22.1
29.7
48.2

Business Status
(4,621)
Number of
management
practicesa
(4,621)

no (0)
yes (1)
none
1 to 3

84.9
15.1
11.1
10.4
37.4
27.0
14.1

Number of
leased acresa
(4,621)

4to6

7 to 9
10 or more
1 to 249
250 to 499
500 to 999
loOo+

none
1 to 4
5 to 9
10 to 14
15 or more

7.0
30.4
31.0
12.8
18.8

Number of
free-access huntersa
(4.621)

none
1 to 4
5 to 9
10 to 14
15 or more

60.0
23.7
9.7
3.5
3.1

10

Standard
Deviation

15.73

14.34

4.98

4.23

2,546

8,187

21.O
25.5
19.6
33.9

Number of
fee-access huntersa
(4,621)
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Table 1, continued
Variables
(# of respondents)
Net lease incomea

(4,449)

Percent
none/loss
$1 to 999

Mean

Standard
Deviation

$4,579

$15,860

14.6

24.1
19.4

1,000-1,999
2,0004,999

22.6

19.3

$5,OOo+

a Categories are for presentation only

The first model explained 15 percent of the variation in landowners'
use of management practices (X4). As predicted, landowners who had
operations in West Texas operated leases the longest, and considered
their operations as businesses used more management practices.
Operational/business status (beta = .345) had the most important effect
on the number of management practices used.
The model for number of acres leased was less successful,
explaining only three percent of the variation in lease acres. Business
status had the only statistically significant beta (.171). Results for
region and years of operation differed from expectations; neither
variable was statistically significant. Size of leases were similar in
both regions of the state and among starting and older operations.
The third model explained almost 27 percent of the variation in
the number of fee-access hunters (X6). Contrary to our hypotheses,
landowners in West Texas leased to fewer hunters (beta = -.125) and
the number of management practices had no effect (beta = .011) on the
number of fee-access hunters. These results may have occurred
because West Texas has more landowners competing for smaller pool
of hunters. The region has a lower population density (i.e., larger land
area relative to population size) and higher concentration of
nonhunting Hispanics than does East Texas (Murdock et al., 1990).
As we expected in our other hypotheses, the number of leased acres
produced the largest effect (beta = .480), while number of operating
years and business status had low, positive (betas < .100) and
statistically significant effects.
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Table 2. Standardized coefficients produced by the regression of
Texas landowners' (n = 4,621) net leasing income on the
characteristics of their hunting lease operations in 1990.
Dependent Variablee
X5
X6
X7

Independent
X4
X8
Variables
.014
-Uc -.046~
D2.3
Region
(XI)
.14gC
- dummy
Years of
(X2)
.095C
gSrS
.028a
.046~
operation
Business
(X3)
.345C .17lc
.08gC .028a
.09gC
status
- dummy
.011 .103C
.037~
Management (X4)
practices
Number of
(X5)
.480C .032a
.510C
leased acres
Number of
(X6)
fee-access
hunters
Number of
(X7)
free-access
hunters
Net lease
--(x8)
income
Adjusted
.I55
.029
.268
.018
.304
R-Square
F-Value
276.4fdd 45.638d 330.768~ 17.872~ 272.230~
a Prob. > I t l was .05
Prob. > I t l was .Ol
Prob. > l t l was ,001
Prob. > F was .0001, with 4,497 degrees of freedom for each
equation, except for the net income equation, which had 4,352 degrees
of freedom.
Underlined coefficients were not as predicted by the research
hypothesis

-m

-ma

Ax!
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The fourth model explained only two percent of the differences in
the numbers of free-access hunters (X7). Although all the betas were
statistically significant in the direction predicted, none was greater
than .loo, except for the number of management practices (beta =
.103). Land-owners who used a larger number of management
practices had leased to more fee-access hunters. Fee-access and
free-access variables had a low, but statistically significant correlation
(r = .081).
The final model explained 30 percent of the variation in net lease
income. Contrary to our hypotheses, the effects by region and
numbers of operating years and free-access hunters were not
statistically significant. Also, the statisticially significant negative
effect by the number of fee-access hunters (beta = -.028) on net lease
income was in the opposite direction predicted. Most of the explained
variation resulted from number of leased acres (beta = .510) and
business status (beta = .099). Landowners who regarded their
operations as businesses and who leased large numbers of acres
produced the most net income.

DISCUSSION
Private landowners control access to the majority of game species
and land resources in Texas (Adams et al. 1992). Economic principles
of supply and demand suggest that profit is often emphasized as the
incentive for landowners to develop and sell hunting leases. Well
managed lease acreages produce higher quality habitats and game,
pariticularly white-tailed deer, and stimulate more hunter demand for
access to such areas. Increased hunter demand and a finite resource
supply thus should produce higher lease fees. If this scenario holds,
we should have observed more landowners treating their lease
operations as businesses, practicing more management, and obtaining
greater net incomes from the sale of hunting lease than we did.
Overall, the typical lease operation in Texas was less formalized
and entreprenurial than we had expected, given the maturity of the
Texas leasing system. Most of the landowners appeared to take an
informal, nonbusiness approach to operating and selling hunting
leases. Other results in our study indicated that almost 29 percent of
the landowners statewide did not consider the license fee paid to sell
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hunting leases to be an operational expense. Further, only 13 percent
viewed their operations as business enterprises, slightly more than half
applied fewer than 5 of 27 possible management practices, and a large
segment (40%) provided free access to hunters. Free-land access by
hunters could dampen lease demand and the amount charged by other
landowners for leases.
Our findings lent support to both the profit maximization
explanation and the economic behavioral explanation of landowners'
lease operations. Many landowners might have regarded the sale of
hunting leases as a "sugar jar" source of supplementing their incomes
rather than pure profit maximizing enterprise. Intensive management
of lease operations would have required large investments of time and
money and greater risks of failure to recoup costs (March and Sevon
1988). By limiting their inputs to the provision of a small number of
management practices, primarily practices that sustain wildlife game
resources, landowners had lower investment risks and more profit
margins, if not the most profits, resulting from the sale of hunting
leases. Some social scientists would argue that this practice is the
essence of profit maximization behavior (Heap 1989; Obrinsky 1983;
Shackel 1970).
A final factor is also worth noting about lease hunting in Texas.
New programs by the TPWD and agencies in other states (Wigley and
Melchiors 1987) can affect lease demand and how landowners provide
resource access to hunters. For example, the TPWD instituted in 1987
the Type I1 Wildlife Management Area Program. In lieu of selling
hunting leases, many owners have turned to the TPWD to manage
wildlife and habitat resources and to control hunting on their lands.
The TPWD provides low cost hunting opportunities to the public by
contracting with private landowners to manage a specified number of
acres for hunting and for wildlife and habitat conservation. After the
TPWD deducts administrative, law enforcement and wildlife
management expenses from the sale of $35 annual permits to hunters,
it pays each landowner a prorated share according to the number of
hunter days spent on a owner's land. In 1989, approximately 3 1,000
permits were sold to hunters providing access to 728,000 acres at 81
sites in Texas (Thomas and Adams 1990-91).
How rural, private landowners manage recreation-related natural
resources is ecologically and economically important. Wildlife
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resources belong to the commonweal and rural landowners are
stewards of these resources. The results of this study imply the need
to extend research on landowners' decision making regarding the
management of these resources, integration of resource management
with other land-use practices including farming and ranching, and
their relationships with the consuming public.

Endnotes
1. Licensees who purchased a license but did not sell hunting leases
accounted for 8,039,437 acres. Nonrespondents to the survey represented
13,965,290 licensed acres. Further, in April, 1990, a random sample of 110
nonrespondents was interviewed by telephone to estimate statistical bias in
the survey. Sampling error was + 9 percent, based on the population of
nonrespondents. Five questions were used to estimate nonresonse bias: (1)
Was this hunting lease in operation during this hunting season? (2) Will this
hunting lease be in operation next year? (3) What is your relationship (i.e.,
landowner, operator, outfitter, or hunter) to this hunting lease? (4) Did you
derive any income from leasing? and (5) In what county is the majority of
this lease located? Responses of this sample were compared with those of
respondents to the the original survey and were tested using the chi square
test. Findings indicated that nonrespondents were less likely than
respondents to have operated leases during the 1989-90 hunting season,
derived income from the sale of hunting leases during 1989-90,and planned
to operate leases the next year. Both groups reported similar percentages of
landowners. Finally, nonrespondents had licensed acres located in 51 of 254
Texas counties. No ecological clustering of these counties was observed.
Overall, these results suggested that nonrespondents were different from the
respondents, whom we considered to have been bona fide lease operators.
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